Example Using RS Voting
SCOTLAND _today has an assembly of 129 comprised of 73 districts electing one Member each FPP style …and another 56 Members chosen from party lists, using PR voting and seat allocation German style.
Were it to install an RS system, a likely scenario would be 100 districts electing Members using ranked choice voting, these districts grouped into 25 regions, each with one Regional Member, for an assembly of 125. …{see also page UK Elections}
Any Existing Assembly —
Say a polity has an Assembly consisting of 64 Members, each elected in a single~Member district. __Now say it installs a Regional Seats style of elections using ranked preference voting — or it could instead be with FPP voting (first~past~post), though preference voting is preferable.
Before, the polity was divided into 64 districts, each electing one Member. However, with the switch to an RS system, say the polity is divided into 14 regions, each subdivided into four single~Member districts. ..Now the number of such districts is 56, each electing one Member directly. So the number of single~Member districts will have fallen by about twelve percent.
But there will also be 14 Regional Members selected, one for each region, so the total of Members in the Assembly rises to (56+14=) 70. ..The Assembly will now be about ten percent larger.
[For Jamaica, whose Assembly now has 63 Members, I suggest having regions of five direct seats each.]
The Regional Member is not voted for directly. ..Instead, the Regional Member is selected by the political party whose unsuccessful candidates within the region got more votes than those unsuccessful for any other party. _(Successful candidates are not included in this tally.)_ With ranked preference voting, it is the first choice on the relevant ballots that are added up.
It is up to each political party how it selects which unsuccessful candidate becomes the region’s Regional Member, and it must be one of their own who ran in that region.
Specific Example of QLD Australia
In adopting a Regional Seats style of election, preference voting would doubtless be kept in Queensland. Likely the number of electorates ..(single~seat districts) would be reduced: ..say, from the current 93 to 84, ..grouped into 21 regions, giving a total of 105 Members in the legislature.
As a rough approximation of what this would look like, one can take nine present electorates — say these become two regions of four districts each, and then look at the 2017 general election results to get a fair notion of how the outcome would be under an RS system of election. ..{This item has not been updated to using 2020 results.}
Of course, voting intentions may change somewhat with regional seats also at stake, particularly for first preference votes. ..Perhaps many more would choose the Green party as a first choice, in hopes they would get the Regional seat.
As one example …consider the SE corner of the state and these nine electorates: Currumbin; Burleigh; Mermaid Beach; Surfers’ Paradise; Mudgeeraba, Gavin; Theodore; Bonney; and Southport. _In 2017 the LNP were tops in first preference votes in all electorates, though one seat was won by Labor.
Now were these only eight districts divided between two regions, it seems Labor would have won both Regional seats, though only one or none of the direct seats. ..So of the ten Members sent to the Assembly, either two or three may have been Labor with the rest all LNP.
The opposite would occur for those parts of Brisbane that returned only Labor Members in 2017. …
Take an arbitrary group of nine adjacent electorates, pretend they become eight districts directly electing one Member each, plus having two Regional Members as well. _Here most likely there would be eight Labor Members and perhaps two LNP Members (unless some other party managed to take one of the regional seats).
In short, the Regional Seats system is neutral and different parties gain Members in areas where they now are shut out. ..This would better represent voters in those areas which today have Members from only one political party. ..Under RS they would always have at least two parties representing them as a region.
A poem –> 
QLD 2020 …set of possible regions
- Peninsula :_ Cook; Barron River; Cairns; Mulgrave; Hill
- North QLD:_ Traeger; Hinchinbrook; Townsville; Mundingburra; Thuringowa; Burdekin
- Mid Coast:_ Whitsunday; Mackay; Mirani; Keppel; Rockhampton; Gladstone
- South QLD:_ Callide; Nanango; Condamine; Southern Downs; Warrego; Gregory
- N Sunshine:_ Burnett; Bundaberg; Maryborough; Hervey Bay; Gympie; Noosa
- S Sunshine:_ Nicklin; Ninderry; Maroochydore; Buderim; Kawana; Caloundra
- Deception Bay:_ Glass House; Pumicestone; Morayfield; Bancroft; Kurwongbah; Pine Rivers
- Brisbane North:_ Redcliffe; Murrumba; Sandgate; Nudgee; Aspley; Everton
- Brisbane Centre N:_ Clayfield; McConnel; Stafford; Ferny Grove; Cooper; Maiwar
- Brisbane Centre S:_ Miller; South Brisbane; Greenslopes; Bulimba; Chatsworth; Mansfield
- Brisbane East:_ Lytton; Oodgeroo; Capalaba; Redlands; Springwood; Macalister
- Brisbane South:_ Logan; Waterford; Woodridge; Stretton; Toohey; Algester
- Brisbane West:_ Jordan; Bundama; Inala; Mount Ommaney; Moggill
- Lockyer Valley:_ Toowoomba N; Toowoomba S; Lockyer; Ipswich West; Ipswich
- Gold Coast:_ Scenic Rim; Mudgeeraba; Currumbin; Burleigh; Mermaid Beach; Surfer’s Paradise
- Tamborine:_ Southport; Bonney; Gaven; Theodore; Broadwater; Coomera
On Proportional Representation:
In theory:
Representation is the basis and foundation upon which an entire edifice of theory concerning politics has been erected. _But does it accord with reality? _Who is supposed to be representative of what? ..The latter question is far too involved to bother with here: one may blather endlessly about that topic. ..But the first question is worth some attention.
When a voter marks their ballot, what is uppermost in their mind? ..I daresay it is not often the particular candidate, and whether that person would best reflect the many opinions and prejudices held by that voter.
Instead, it is usually the party the candidate is of and all that entails. It may be the party’s platform: ..presumably, the voter marks for some party’s candidate because that party best aligns — or seems to — with that voter’s major concerns. Yet, it might not be that at all.
A major factor is which of the party leaders the voter likes best, for whatever reasons. _Especially is this true in Quebec, where the leader is often the main vote attractor. ..As instance, waves of enthusiasm for Jack Layton gave the NDs half the seats there in the 2011 federal election, a singular achievement for the party. ..Ten years on and the NDs now get one MP elected.
Similarly, in the provincial election of 2007 enthusiasm for Mario Dumont exploded the ADQ from 4 seats to over 40 and made them the leading opposition party. ..Whereafter the positions taken in the Assembly by M. Dumont woke the population up to what he actually proposed doing, and in the 2008 election the ADQ plummeted to just 7 seats. And then in disarray, it disappeared.
Obviously, the electorate may also be repelled by a leader, which may result in regime change when that leader is Premier, as the Canada 2015 election clearly demonstrated. …It was certainly a factor in the MB 2023 election as well.
Yet, sometimes it is the party that voters want thrown out of office regardless of who the leader may be: ..as witness AB 2015, BC 2001, and perhaps QB 2018; though antipathy to the leader was also a factor in NS 2013, MB 2016, and ON 2018.
All of which fails to support the notion that primarily voters wish to be “represented”. Which is the rationale for PR voting systems, but does not often accord with voter behaviour, who can be vengeful. …Voters want to install or throw out a government when they mark their ballots, which is not an immediate result when PR voting is in place.
Yikes!
It might not have been the intention of those who installed PR voting in so many countries in Europe to boost the progress of authoritarianism, to fan the embers of neo~fascism or of like movements. Yet, that is precisely what has happened. ___(this website is regionalseats.ca/wp/)
Blame may be laid upon “power sharing” multi~party cabinets, which too often.. through mutual stubbornness ..prove unable to take effective action on sundry matters that matter to their electorates.
Having grown weary of unresolved issues hanging about like so many bad smells, in their frustration many voters then find the rhetoric of authoritarian types more attractive than hither to. ..For this sort of leader promises clear action, even if it means flouting existing laws or introducing peculiar new ones.
That frustrated publics, fed up with ineffectual governments, become inclined to give authoritarian leaders their support is simply fact. ..Not that mere fact, however distressing, ought be allowed to gainsay a fine tale that has taken on an aspect of myth.
Such is the tale told by advocates of PR about “power sharing” and how wondrously it causes the several parties in a coalition cabinet to necessarily compromise in order to get things done.
Though in reality they often decline to do so in a meaningful way, and in consequence take no effective action at all on some issues. ..These might remain unresolved year after year: …and carry on and on, and on. Too many of these hanging about becomes intolerable to much of the public.
Enter the strong leader — what else could be expected? When the stage is set for such to appear, someone will step forward to occupy centre stage. And if that strong leader is stymied? Well, there is always the coup d’état in those countries which will tolerate such. Where it has happened before, it may happen again.
Conclusion__ PR voting can have consequences its most emphatic supporters dare not think about.
Why Regional Seats?
Some years’ ago I devised the Regional Seats system of election with three objectives in mind:
a].. to typically provide majority government — as it is the most accountable sort;
b].. to always have a workable size of opposition; and
c].. to prevent extensive areas from being represented by only one party.
Just Follow the Logic
1.___ A pure Proportional Representation system of elections, especially one with a low threshold for obtaining seats, nurtures a serious flaw: ..for it may reward intransigent minor parties with seats in cabinet, thereby hardening their resolve. Such success breeds imitation, so other minor parties become intransigent in some degree. Large umbrella parties may become hobbled by the necessity of trying to govern with such stubbornly uncompromising minor partners.
<< note_ Some countries can hardly be said to have true large umbrella parties at all. ..The Nederlands is one such. _In the 2021 election held in March, more than 30 parties put up candidates, and 17 got at least one seat in the Assembly. ..The top party captured only 22% of the vote, the 2nd another 15%. ..About 80% of the vote went to the eight parties who met or surpassed a 5% vote threshold. _The previous election in 2017 saw 13 parties getting seats
Forming a coalition gov’t is a tedious process in that country, requiring very detailed negotiations. ..It took an astonishing eight months to form a four~party gov’t in 2017! ..And 2021 was about the same.>>
The problem stems from a fundamental misapprehension of the role of a legislature: ..It is a place of governing, not a debating club. .. It need not represent all shades of opinion at large in the entity it legislates for.
That should be adequately provided for outside the legislature with permissive traditions respecting freedom of speech and civil organisation. The role of a legislature is in fact quite limited: ..it is where laws are passed and where government budgets get approved.
The latter entails holding those who exercise power to account for their spending and spending priorities: ..for what they are doing, how well they are doing it, and what they are failing to do. ..These things are all a legislature need do, for that is its purpose.
Strong rather than weak government works better: ..large umbrella parties rather than a proliferation of minor squabbling ones. _After all, government by a single party is the most accountable form. Voters clearly know who has been making the decisions … even if it is only choosing which corporate lobbyists to pay most attention to.
So the electoral system should provide such — with balance — for an active opposition in the legislature is necessary as well. Still, when voters go to the polls they expect to be choosing a government, something proportional systems do not immediately provide.
Proportional Perversity
2.__ Rarely do a majority of electors favour any one political party: _so apportioning seats in proportion yields a legislative Assembly comprised of many factions, even though most often two parties are larger than any of the others. ..Each will want to govern, and each will try to control a majority of seats in the Assembly without including in the governing coalition its major rival.
This often results in having several parties in cabinet,(four is not unusual) including one or more stubborn minor parties who bargain hard to get the government they join to act is very specific ways on issues important to that minor party.
Such a system is perverse because it rewards intransigence amongst the minor parties.
Each gains adherents by being so strongly for some particular issue or set of issues. In consequence, minor party leaders feel unable to compromise much on their core issues, for fear of losing supporters. ..Which means they are apt to leave any coalition government if action on their agenda stalls.
Coalitions falling apart are a frequent feature of such a system, as witness several instances in recent years.
There were two elections in Austria in 2019, and Italy barely avoided having an early election when the governing coalition fell apart mid 2019 due to the largest party pulling out. …Yet, the very unlikely new coalition gov’t lasted hardly 18 months, followed by a period of uncertainty. Italy will have another election in autumn of 2022.
In mid 2019 Spain was unable to get a coalition together and a second election was called for November, five months after the one in March. ..Greece had two elections in 2012 and again in 2015, four in four years. ..In 2023 their election of May 21st, under a straight proportional system, provided no majority and the lead party declined to attempt a coalition. The other four parties winning seats could not create one either, so new elections were called for late June. This time the lead party will get a bonus of at least 25 extra seats, which it did and was able to form a majority government.
Bulgaria held a 3rd election in Nov 2021 after earlier elections in April and July resulted in no governing coalition being formed. ..This last time only 20 parties and coalitions were contesting, about half as many as in April. ..A four~party coalition cabinet was formed but did not last, and yet another election was set for October of 2022. …Other examples of instability could be cited.
3.___ Many who favour proportionality disguise it by advocating a “mixed” system where some Members are elected directly FPP style (first-past-the-post), while the rest are selected using a proportioning procedure that takes into account the wins a party obtains in the FPP contests. ..This so~called “mixed” system is a proportional system thinly disguised. Calling it mixed is deceptive propaganda.
A truly mixed system would see the seats distributed in proportion approximate the percentage of party vote obtained, then adding these to the seats won directly. ..Some call this a parallel mixed system, and it has been in use in Japan and Korea, where single~party government is usual due to the proportional seats being few and the direct seats many.
4.___ The FPP seats system has two drawbacks. ..First, it often results in one party winning many adjacent seats in an area, perhaps an extensive area, to the exclusion of other parties, or almost so. ..Repeated election after election, such areas become identified with particular parties. _This seems a general phenomenon._ Thus Toronto gets identified with Liberals; ..Calgary with some conservative party; ..rural southern England with the Conservatives, but Wales means mainly Labour.
<<note: This is also true where ranked preference voting is employed, as can be seen in the results of any State election in Australia. >>
Second, a large difference may exist between the number of seats won by the leading party and any other, resulting in only a few in opposition. _A striking instance was the 2021 election in the State of Western Australia, when Labor won 90% of the 59 seats in their Assembly [using ranked preference voting, it may be noted].
Many instances of this are seen in Provincial legislatures in Canada where huge wins may and do occur. ..Two such from 2001: ..Alberta elected only nine opposition Members (of 83), while in BC a mere two were left (of 79). [see ‘Huge Wins’ table in the RS companion article below.]
5.___ Clearly, FPP alone is not ideal. ..Various remedies might be attempted, such as requiring the winner to get over half the votes by using a preference ballot. Yet, this will not prevent a determined electorate – or a lemming~like one – to hand some party a massive victory. ..Nor will this itself prevent party domination of wide areas.
What is needed is a system that always provides a sufficient number in opposition to be effective, while still using FPP voting (or ranked preference voting). The Regional Seats system guarantees this, as I specifically designed it to do so. ….
Regional Seats System
Get acquainted with it …
The Regional Seats system of voting would consistently yield the desired result of strong governments plus effective oppositions, thus improving on our current first~past~post (FPP) election results. ..RS retains a direct connexion of candidates to voters and yields single~party governments. ..Under RS voting coalition government would be rare: perhaps confined to a national emergency such as the country being in a major war.
RS works like this…
The polity is divided into regions that typically have four or five single~seat districts where elections proceed as usual. After the votes are counted and winners declared, the Regional Deputy is selected, ..who also will be in the Legislative Assembly with the same rights and privileges as any other Deputy.
Due to how regional representatives are chosen, each small region necessarily has Deputies from at least two political parties. ..Having small regions prevents exclusivity, since one party cannot dominate any one region let alone a more extensive area of adjacent electoral districts, as now often occurs with FPP voting_ (with ranked preference voting, too).
There are two immediate consequences of this: _1) wide areas of adjacent seats cannot be the preserve of any party; and _2) the opposition in number cannot be smaller than the number of regions: ..a functional size of opposition is guaranteed .. [though it may be of several parties].
Under RS rules, no candidates run for the regional seat directly. It is awarded indirectly, based on the votes for the candidates running in the electoral districts of the region. ..So what voters see, and what news media report on, are the contests in the single~Member districts.
Voting may be identical to now, the ballot given each voter listing the candidates running in the district. The voter marks it once for one candidate, and the one getting the most votes wins the seat. ..Thus far an RS election would be identical to a pure FPP election, the only difference being the name of the region also appearing somewhere on the ballot.
Alternatively, ranked preference voting may be used in these single~Member districts, in which case the ballot would then be different. This is described later in the companion article: ‘Benefits of the RS System‘. ..For now, FPP voting is presumed.
Media coverage election night would pay attention to who is ahead in each district. ..Then as the night wears on and many seats have declared winners, attention would shift to which party has won -or is likely to win- each regional seat. ..By evenings end, except for a few tight races, viewers would know the candidates elected directly, how many regional seats each party gets, who will form the next government and who will be the Official Opposition, and how many seats in total each party will have in the new Assembly.
What viewers would not know is the identity of the Regional Members, though they would know the party affiliation of each — except where a tight race makes that uncertain.
Who gets the Regional seat?
Determining which party wins a regional seat is simplicity itself: merely tally the votes of the unelected candidates within the region by party affiliation to see which party has the most. It wins the region and thus the right to name its Regional Member (Deputy). Votes for winning candidates are ignored — after all, those voters got who they voted for. Votes for unaffiliated candidates are also ignored, as only an official political party is eligible to win the regional seat. ..Simple, transparent, readily understood, plus it assures that every region with be represented by at least two political parties.
Except, it is better to use percentages of the vote the candidates got and tally these rather than raw votes. For electoral districts are usually based on total population rather than on those of voting age, so numbers of eligible voters among districts do differ.
One comprised largely of families with young children will have fewer eligible voters than another with fewer children. Voter turnout also differs, some districts habitually having lower participation. Yet, if any district is expected to have a close contest, that will boost voter turnout there.
In consequence, districts within a region may experience markedly different numbers of ballots cast, so it is better to use percentages of votes cast rather than raw numbers. This provides a fairer view of the relative popularity of each party’s several candidates, something of importance when choosing who to select as Regional Deputy.
Example of a region
Here is an example of a hypothetical region using the results of two consecutive Provincial elections. _Of course, voting intentions would change somewhat with a regional seat also at stake, but this is at least indicative of what to expect under RS.
The leader of the party winning a regional seat has the right, though is not obliged, to nominate a candidate for Regional Member. Eligible nominees are candidates who ran unsuccessfully for that party within the region. ..None else are eligible: not any independent candidate, nor any successful one, nor a candidate of another party, nor anyone who ran elsewhere.
With one exception: ..If the leader of the party winning the region is not then a Member of the Assembly, said leader may nominate him/her self the Regional Deputy regardless of where (or if) that person ran unsuccessfully (or at all).
<< note: ..This is the case in Canada, where parties are very top down and the leader typically has final say in who the candidate will be. Parachuting in a candidate of the leader’s choice does happen sometimes. ..In Britain, by contrast, local party associations choose the candidates, and so would likely also choose any Regional Members, by whatever process the party devised.>>
Nominees would routinely be accepted by the relevant official, provided the nominee is an eligible one and the person doing the nominating is unambiguously the current leader of the relevant party — which may be in question in exceptional circumstances. Should that official refuse to accept the nominee, or the relevant leader decline to nominate anyone, then the seat would remain vacant. For Provincial contests in Canada, that official might be its Lieutenant Governor.
Functional Size of Opposition
Every few years a Provincial election produces a startlingly huge majority, clearly a major flaw of pure FPP voting. Such results are readily ridiculed by proponents of proportional representation (PR), which are several voting systems that have their own major flaws.
Installing RS would ameliorate such lop:sided results in the single~Member districts, and thereby blunt criticism — For oppositions of sufficient size to be effective are one benefit of RS.
As an example, PEI could have at least five in the opposition from having five regions in an Assembly of thirty in total. PEI has had fewer in opposition than that several times, so RS would be a distinct improvement. ..Barbados has the same size of Assembly and in 2020 no opposition Members at all!
<< note: ..Even with ranked preference voting such may occur. .. In its 2021 election, the winning party got 90% of the 59 seats in the State of Western Australia, leaving six in the opposition. Perth, the main city with ~65% of the state’s population, has a lone opposition Member in its Assembly. With an RS system Perth would be 6 or 7 regions.>
In the table below the likely number of regions at that time is shown, as well as my estimate of how many opposition Members in total there may be, from all parties not in the government. What is remarkable is how huge many of these results were. RS would provide more workable sizes of oppositions.
Party Leaders
Sometimes a political party chooses a new leader who is not a sitting Member of the legislature. RS would make getting the new leader into the Assembly easier, provided that party has at least one region it has won. Once vacant (by having the Regional Member resign) the new leader may name her/him self its Regional Deputy. No fuss and no waiting for a by~election opportunity to arrive.
Currently, an unelected leader must find a ‘safe seat‘ held by the party in which to have the incumbent resign so the leader can run — and presumably win — once a by~election gets called. ..RS would render this farcical expedient practically an historical curiosity, so rarely would it ever again be needed (at least by major parties).
Comparison with PR
Scotland gained an Assembly not so long ago, the first election to it was in 1999 using the cheating sort of “mixed” PR voting in which some Members were directly elected in single~Member districts FPP style, while others were chosen from party lists in each of eight regions, based on the second vote on the ballot for parties. Scotland’s Parliament consists of 56 party list seats and 73 direct seats for a total of 129.
But as the apportioning formula for list seats takes into account any wins in the FPP contests, the overall percentage of seats a party gets in Scotland’s Parliament closely mirrors its party vote percentage. ..Obviously, a party with many FPP wins will get fewer of the list seats than its percentage of that second vote for parties, and so in that sense it is badly cheated.
The predictable result in 1999 was a coalition government. Though Labour won 73% of the direct seats, it got only 43% of the seats in the Assembly and could not govern alone despite its obvious popularity. RS would have provided the majority government voters clearly wanted, had the 73 direct seats been grouped into 18 regions with one Regional Member each.
The Regional Seats system would have given Scotland government by one party while it instead had a coalition cabinet. Judging by the results in the FPP contests — 73% for Labour — RS would have provided what the voters wanted. Such a large result would be a big win almost anywhere in Canada as well.
Some background:
- RS was first described in the Canadian Parliamentary Review, the Spring issue of 2001 (after the Cdn Journal of Political Science declined it).
- If you’ve never heard of RS, blame the professors of Politics for not teaching it these many years.
- Blame also goes to the Library of Parliament [of Canada] whose 2016 background paper on electoral systems failed to include RS, an exclusion that possibly was deliberate.
- After all, the Librarian has not apologised to me for this, or even communicated with me at all; ..and there is still no mention of this voting system anywhere on the Library’s website.
- That 2016 paper has not been revised to include RS, yet anyone today requesting information about alternative voting systems is steered to that paper. ..It means the Librarian is now .deliberately misleading the public. about electoral systems, and because of that should resign — or be asked to (in effect fired).
- Meetings about federal electoral reform held late in 2016 used that background paper and consequently did not offer RS as an option to the attendees.
- That whole electoral reform process was a fiasco anyway, undertaken with no real sincerity by the Prime Minister; _his party back benchers in Parliament were upset about it (not publicly, of course, but in a raucous caucus meeting).
Main Benefits of the RS system:
The Regional Seats voting system retains the best features of first-past-the-post (FPP) voting while correcting its main deficiencies. RS typically provides government by a single party as does FPP usually. RS also retains the direct connexion of voters with the candidates running and therefore with those who succeed in getting elected.
It is crystal clear to voters who to praise or blame for anything done well, done badly, or left undone — also for any initiatives taken and for promises kept or unkept. For no coalition partner exists to blame shortcomings on: a party governing alone cannot hide in that way.
As for improving the outcomes of general elections, having Regional Deputies does guarantee a functional size of opposition will be present. It also means no party can dominate an area completely as now frequently happens. Each small region will be represented by at least two political parties, for even when one party wins all the seats in a region, its Regional Member will be of another party. Usually also, both the governing party and the Official Opposition will have at least one Deputy from every major area of the polity, or very nearly so. This statement is based on results of over fifty general elections recast as if an RS system had existed.
RS voting does not change who will form a government, but it does alter the composition of party legislative caucuses, adding to a largely urban party a few rural deputies, and urban deputies to an otherwise largely rural one. This is especially true for Saskatchewan. (A table showing this over eight elections is in the Manitoba/SK elections page.) Or for parties who are dominant in different areas — such as Edmonton and Calgary, or northern and southern New Brunswick — the same benefit obtains. Each caucus would have a better balance than FPP results tend to provide.
Additional Benefits:
An RS system would also retain or gain some prominent politicians otherwise absent from an Assembly. As instance, in its 2003 election Saskatchewan saw no Liberals elected, yet one or more would likely have been present as Regional Members had that system of voting been in place.
In 1990, Ontario Liberals were defeated including Premier Peterson, yet with RS voting he could have remained as a Regional Member. Defeated cabinet Ministers could sometimes remain in an Assembly, as in Alberta 2015 and 2018; Manitoba 2016; Ontario 2018; Quebec 2018; and in Canada 2015. (These pale compared to BC in 2001 when the entire cabinet and Premier were all defeated.)
Between elections RS would heighten political awareness, for in a sixth or so of the electoral districts two candidates who ran would both be in the Assembly, one directly elected and the other the Regional representative. Each would be sending mailings to constituents, and come the next election likely both would again run — lively contests, especially if the Regional Deputy is in cabinet.
RS would heighten election campaigning overall. Consider a region swept by one party: for the other parties winning the regional seat may hinge on the difference between getting fifteen percent or so of the vote versus over twenty. Thus an incentive would exist to try harder in every seat in the region despite being unlikely to win any seat directly.
It entails having presentable candidates, and preferably one of star quality, which the lure of becoming the Regional Member would make easier to recruit. As well, the dominant party wants no lackluster backbencher facing a star opponent, especially one who is already the Regional Member: that could be defeat where a win was expected. So, the overall quality of Members should improve.
Regional Members may be of new parties: the Green Party perhaps in BC 2017, in ON 2007. Preference voting with RS would definitely help a new party to become voters’ first choice on the ballot.
Regional Seats with Preference Voting:
This refers to system where to win a candidate must get over half of the valid ballots cast. Voters are asked to rank order the candidates, which may be restricted to just three choices — 1st, 2nd, 3rd, using boxes like a lottery ticket in front of each candidate’s name. So, three columns, fill in one box in each column: this facilitates machine reading of the ballots.
If when using only the 1st preferences no candidate passes the 50.0% hurdle, then the other preferences of the lowest polling candidates come into play. For instance, all candidates below fourth place have their ballots transferred, each ballot going to whichever of the top four candidates has the highest preference on it.
If still no candidate passes the hurdle, then the fourth place candidate at that point (including the transferred ballots) is dropt and those ballots transferred to the remaining three candidates; and if that still fails to get a candidate over the hurdle, the lowest remaining candidate is dropt and those ballots transferred. With only two candidates left to receive them, the one with the most post transfer is declared elected, whether or not it represents over half the valid ballots cast.
As for determining the party winning the regional seat, the 1st preference votes, other than those for the winning candidate, may be used. The procedure is otherwise the same as when FPP voting is employed.
Propagandists
Are most professors of Politics propagandists for Proportional Rep? … Having papers published in academic journals boosts an academic’s career, yet to my knowledge none have been published on the RS system. ..Nor, apparently, do the professors teach it (though perhaps today in 2022 a few do). ..Obviously, educators would teach all relevant voting systems. Truly, in Canada, among the academics teaching Politics as a subject, RS has truly been the pariah of voting systems.
Summary of Benefits:
1] Government by a single party is usual;
2] Direct connexion of candidates with voters is kept;
3] Opposition of a functional size is certain, as 17% or so of the Assembly sits in opposition (but ~ 15% federally);
4] Non-exclusivity: ..each small region elects Members from at least two political parties;
5] Top two parties have better urban/rural [or other split] in their legislative caucuses;
6] Top two parties typically each represent all, or nearly all, areas of the polity;
7] Retains or gains some prominent politicians who otherwise would be absent from the Assembly;
8] Attracting a few quality candidates is made easier;
9] Better overall quality of Members in the Assembly: for leaders have choice in naming Regional Members;
10] Heightened political awareness between elections;
11] More lively contests, as up to 20% of the seats may have two sitting Members going head to head for votes;
12] Greater campaigning effort by parties in all seats of most regions;
13] Easier for a new party to get its first seats in an Assembly;
14] Ease of getting a new party leader into an Assembly who is not already in it; and
15] If desired, may use ranked preference voting instead of first-past-the-post.